The rising tensions between Iran and the United States have once again exposed the uncomfortable truth at the heart of India’s energy strategy: despite years of diversification talk, the country remains dangerously tied to one narrow maritime corridor, the Strait of Hormuz.
More than half of India’s crude imports now pass through this volatile stretch of water. In calmer times, that statistic barely draws attention. In today’s geopolitical climate, it should set off alarm bells across North Block and corporate boardrooms alike.
The numbers tell a stark story. In just a few months, India’s dependence on Hormuz-linked supplies has surged from roughly 40% to over 52% of total crude inflows. That means every diplomatic flare-up in the Gulf now carries the potential to ripple straight into India’s fuel prices, inflation outlook and current account balance. For an economy still fighting cost pressures, this is not a distant risk, it is an immediate vulnerability.
The irony is that this growing exposure is not the result of complacency, but of constrained choices. As Western sanctions tightened the screws on Moscow late last year, Indian refiners trimmed Russian purchases and pivoted back towards Middle Eastern grades. The Gulf offered stability, reliability and easier logistics. What it could not offer was insulation from geopolitics.
Now, as tensions escalate around Iran, the very corridor meant to anchor India’s supply security has become its biggest point of fragility.
This is where the Russia question quietly re-enters the picture.
Data and market intelligence from Kpler suggests that if Hormuz flows face disruption, Indian refiners may once again look towards Russian crude to safeguard energy security. Not because it is politically convenient. Not even because it is necessarily cheaper. But because in moments of crisis, energy systems prioritise continuity over diplomacy.
Russia served precisely that role after the Ukraine conflict reshaped global oil markets. Discounted barrels flowed into Indian ports, cushioning the economy from the worst of global price spikes. For a period, Moscow became India’s single largest crude supplier, a development that would have seemed improbable just a few years earlier.
That experiment was never meant to be permanent. Sanctions risk, financing hurdles and shipping complications ensured that Russian oil would remain a tactical option rather than a strategic pillar. But geopolitics has a way of reviving old solutions when new ones start wobbling.
If the Strait of Hormuz becomes unstable whether through military escalation, shipping disruptions or heightened security risks, Russia could again emerge as a pressure valve in India’s energy system.
This is not about choosing sides in global power struggles. It is about acknowledging how brutally pragmatic energy security becomes when supply lines are threatened.
The deeper concern is structural.
India imports nearly 85% of its oil needs. Most of that oil comes from countries whose exports must squeeze through one of the world’s most contested waterways. Even as renewable capacity expands and electric mobility gathers pace, crude oil will remain central to India’s economy for decades. Manufacturing, logistics, aviation, petrochemicals, all still run on hydrocarbons.
Yet the geographic concentration of supply risk remains largely unchanged.
Every flare-up in the Middle East now triggers the same questions: Will shipping continue? Will insurance premiums spike? Will freight costs soar? Will Brent prices surge overnight?
This cycle repeats because the underlying vulnerability has never been meaningfully resolved.
Strategic petroleum reserves offer only temporary buffers. Long-term contracts provide little comfort when tankers cannot sail. Diplomatic balancing acts can soften shocks, but cannot neutralise chokepoints.
What India faces is not a short-term supply scare, it is a long-term geopolitical exposure problem.
The Strait of Hormuz carries nearly one-fifth of the world’s seaborne oil trade. For major Gulf producers – Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE and Kuwait, it is the primary export artery. As long as India’s crude basket remains anchored to these suppliers, Hormuz will remain India’s energy Achilles’ heel.
Russian oil may reappear in contingency planning if the Gulf corridor destabilises. But that, too, is a workaround not a solution.
The larger lesson from the current tension is clear: diversification must go beyond shifting between suppliers who all rely on the same chokepoint. It must involve broader geographic sourcing, accelerated energy transition, and far deeper investment in alternatives that structurally reduce oil dependence.
Until then, India will continue to ride a geopolitical roller coaster, switching barrels when crises erupt, absorbing price shocks when routes tremble, and reacting rather than anticipating.
The Strait of Hormuz is not just a shipping lane. It is the narrow bridge between India’s economic stability and global political turbulence.
And as today’s tensions once again demonstrate, as long as that bridge remains the backbone of India’s crude supply, energy security will always be one crisis away from being tested.
